Some have tried to make miracles compatible with the laws of nature by re-defining them as something other than interventions. By contrast, this article argues that although miracles are divine interventions, they are not violations of the laws of nature. Miracles are also not exceptions to the laws, nor do the laws not apply to them. The laws never have exceptions; they never are violated or suspended, are probably necessary and unchangeable, and apply also to divine interventions. We need to (...) reconsider not miracles but laws. The main claim of this article is that laws of nature do not entail regularities, and therefore that miracles do not violate the laws. We need a new theory of the laws of nature: the tendency theory. (shrink)

The argument from causal closure for physicalism requires the principle that a physical event can only occur through being necessitated by antecedent physical events. This article proposes a view of the causal structure of the world that claims not only that an event need not be necessitated by antecedent events, but that an event cannot be necessitated by antecedent events. All events are open to counteraction. In order to spell out various kinds of counteraction I introduce the idea of ‘directedness.’.

Bei der Renaissance der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen über Gott spielte der Oxforder Philosoph Richard Swinburne eine wesentliche Rolle. Er kann als der bedeutendste zeitgenössische Vertreter der natürlichen Theologie gelten. Natürliche Theologie ist das Unternehmen, philosophisch zu untersuchen, ob es einen Gott gibt und wie er beschaffen ist. Dies ›philosophisch‹ und nicht theologisch zu untersuchen, heißt, direkte Offenbarung dabei nicht als Erkenntnisquelle zu verwenden.

This article introduces the notion of the directedness of a process, which underlies event causation as well as the persistence of things. Using this notion it investigates what happens in typical cases of active event causation. Causes never necessitate their effects because even non- probabilistic causes can be counteracted.

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.

The claim of this article is that no event can determine a later event and that in this sense there cannot be sufficient causes. Therefore the causal structure of the world does not exclude free will, even if there are no chance processes.

Friedrich Schleiermacher suggested that his project was to make Christianity compatible with reason and with the natural sciences. This article argues that Schleiermacher re- jected Christian doctrine und developed a religion which he called ‘Christian’ but which does not contain the Chris- tian doctrine and which is not rational. The article sketches Schleiermachers rejection of Christian doctrine, examines his claim that the natural sciences exclude miracles, criti- cises Schleiermachers non-cognitivism, and sketches the role of doctrine in Christianity.

Einige versuchen, Wunder mit den Naturgesetzen vereinbar zu machen, indem sie „Wunder“ als etwas anderes als göttliche Eingriffe definieren. Dieser Aufsatz behauptet hin- gegen, daß Wunder die Naturgesetze nicht verletzen, obwohl sie göttliche Eingriffe sind. Wunder sind auch keine „Ausnah- men“ der Naturgesetze, noch treffen die Naturgesetze nicht auf sie zu. Naturgesetze haben nie Ausnahmen, sie werden nie verletzt oder ausgesetzt, sie sind wahrscheinlich notwen- dig und unveränderlich, und sie treffen auch auf göttliche Ein- griffe zu. Wir sollten nicht unsere (...) Vorstellung von Wundern, sondern unsere Vorstellung der Naturgesetze in Frage stel- len. Die Hauptthese dieses Aufsatzes ist, daß Naturgesetze keine Abfolgeregelmäßigkeiten implizieren und daß deshalb Wunder die Naturgesetze nicht verletzen. Wir brauchen eine neue Theorie der Naturgesetze: die Tendenztheorie. (shrink)

‘Enlightenment’ (in German, ‘Aufklärung’) is not simply the name of a movement or development whose existence is uncontroversial. Rather, the claim ‘The 18th century was the age of enlightenment’ or ‘In Germany, there was the Enlightenment’ entail certain claims which need to be discussed. This article argues that some of these claims are false and that therefore the claim ‘The Enlightenment does not exist’ is true.

Die liberale Theologie geht davon aus, daß man die traditionelle christliche Lehre heute nicht mehr glauben kann und daß man sie deshalb verändern muß. Sie will sich nicht vom Christentum offen absagen, sondern das Christentum verändern oder eine neue Version des Christentums einführen. Radical Orthodoxy (RO), vor allem von John Milbank gegründet, will eine Gegenbewegung dazu sowie zum Säkularismus sein: „A theology which claims to be radical and orthodox“. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich untersuchen, ob sie es wirklich ist, und (...) ich werde Indizien dafür vorstellen, daß sie es nicht ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund werde ich dann die Analytische Religionsphilosophie (oder Analytische Theologie) als Alternative vorstellen. (shrink)

Zwischen 1960 und 2000 beschränkten sich viele deutsch- sprachige Philosophieprofessoren auf Philosophiegeschichts- schreibung, sie verteidigten nicht ihre eigenen Antworten auf philosophische Fragen. Dieser Aufsatz legt dar, wie die Annahme der Existenz von Epochen ein Grund für diese Beschränkung ist, und plädiert dafür, daß die Suche nach Antworten auf die philosophischen Fragen auch heute durch nichts ersetzt werden kann und soll.

Dieser Aufsatz hält der Meinung, daß die Analytische Religionsphilosophie zu rationalistisch sei, entgegen, daß es auch in Sachen Religion nicht zu viel Vernunft geben kann. Dies begründe ich, indem ich das Zweistufenmodell des christlichen Glaubens verteidige, nach dem der christliche Glaube einerseits aus dem Annehmen einer metaphysischen Lehre und andererseits aus einer darauf gründenden Hingabe besteht. Dies ist ein Kennzeichen einer sowohl tiefen als auch rationalen Religion.

English: Between 1960 and 2000 many German-speaking professors of philosophy confined their research to the history of philosophy, they did not defend their own answers to philosophical questions. This article describes some possible causes of this phenomenon, makes a plea for defending answers to philosophical questions, and gives some guidelines for doing so which anticipate some objections. -/- German: Zwischen 1960 und 2000 beschränkten sich viele deutschsprachige Philosophieprofessoren auf Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung, sie verteidigten nicht ihre eigenen Antworten auf philosophische Fragen. Dieser Aufsatz (...) beschreibt einige mögliche Ursachen dafür, ruft dazu auf, wieder Antworten auf philosophische Fragen zu verteidigen, und schlägt einige Leitlinien dafür vor, welche einigen Einwänden vorbeugen sollen. (shrink)

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

This article presents Roman Ingarden’s theory of causation, as developed in volume III of The Controversy about the Existence of the World, and defends analternative which uses some important insights of Ingarden. It rejects Ingarden’s claim that a cause is simultaneous with its effect and that a cause necessitates its effect. It uses Ingarden’s notion of ‘inclinations’ and accepts Ingarden’s claim that an event cannot necessitate a later event.

Los milagros no violan las leyes naturales.

Review of Gottesbeweise als Herausforderung für die moderne Vernunft, ed. Th. Buchheim.

Discusses Armstrong's and Roman Ingarden's ontology, criticises substance ontology, and defends tropes and a field ontology.

The dilemma of free will is that if actions are caused deterministically, then they are not free, and if they are not caused deterministically then they are not free either because then they happen by chance and are not up to the agent. I propose a conception of free will that solves this dilemma. It can be called agent causation but it differs from what Chisholm and others have called so.

The tendency theory of causation and its use in ontological engineering is described.

Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.

A theory of causation with ‘tendencies’ as causal con- nections is proposed. Not, however, as ‘necessary connec- tions’: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causation. Therefore it does not strictly contradict any analysis of the concept of causation, not even reduct- ive ones. It would even be supported by a counterfactual or a probabilistic (...) analysis. (shrink)

This article argues that there is a great divide between semantics and metaphysics. Much of what is called metaphysics today is still stuck in the linguistic turn. This is illustrated by showing how Fraser MacBride misunderstands David Armstrong's theory of modality.

Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

Although many philosophers today have turned away slightly from the linguistic turn, their methods, e.g. conceptual analysis, are still linguistic. These methods lead to false results. The right method in philosophy, like in other disciplines, is to try to perceive the object and to collect and weigh evidence. We must turn back to things in themselves.

Trope ontology is exposed and confronted with the question where one trope ends and another begins. It is argued that tropes do not have determinate boundaries, it is arbitrary how tropes are carved up. An ontology, which I call field ontology, is proposed which takes this into account. The material world consists of a certain number of fields, each of which is extended over all of space. It is shown how field ontology can also tackle the problem of determin-able properties (...) and the problem of completeness of things. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are true synthetic modal claims and that modal questions in philosophy in general are to be interpreted not in terms of logical necessity but in terms of synthetic necessity. I begin by sketching the debate about modality between logical positivism and phenomenology. Logical empiricism taught us to equate being tautological with being necessary. The common view is that tautologies are necessary in the narrow sense but that there is also necessity in a wider sense. I (...) argue against this that we should distinguish necessity from analyticity and possibility from consistency. (shrink)

This article argues that agents can initiate causal processes.

Internal relations are nothing over and above the terms of the relation.

Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican as well as Janusz Salomon put forward versions of supernaturalism that avoid the existence of a religion which alone provides the true revelation and the only way to salvation and which teaches that God acted in this world. Their rejection of revealed, exclusive religion is based on an argument from religious diversity and an argument from natural explanations of religious phenomena. These two together form the "common-core/diversity dilemma". In this article I refute these two arguments (...) by arguing that explaining the origin of belief in supernatural agents does not provide a reason for not believing in the existence of supernatural agents. (shrink)